Insider Brief
- The International Institute for Strategic Studies concludes that Western governments are transforming quantum export controls from a reactive security measure into a broader industrial strategy aimed at shaping the future quantum ecosystem while limiting rivals’ access to critical technologies.
- The analysis identifies a small number of supply chain “choke points”—including dilution refrigerators, isotopically enriched silicon, cryogenic systems and quantum control electronics—as the most effective targets for coordinated export controls because they are produced by relatively few suppliers in allied countries.
- The report argues that export controls alone cannot secure long-term quantum leadership, emphasizing that governments must pair them with industrial policy, investment screening and sustained support for strategically important quantum companies to maintain their technological advantage.
Western governments are no longer using export controls simply to restrict sensitive quantum technologies—they are increasingly using them to shape the future structure of the global quantum industry, according to a new analysis from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
According to the report, the United States and several allies have fundamentally changed how they approach export controls for emerging technologies. Rather than waiting for quantum computing to mature into a commercially established industry, governments are imposing restrictions across nearly the entire quantum supply chain while simultaneously investing billions of dollars to strengthen domestic industrial capacity.
IISS researchers Dongyoun Cho and Dr. Maria Shagina write that this marks a transition from traditional export-control policy toward what they describe as “anticipatory containment” — an effort to slow strategic rivals before quantum technologies become widely commercialized while preserving enough international scientific collaboration to sustain innovation.
The strategy reflects growing concern that quantum computing could eventually deliver military and intelligence advantages through applications ranging from cryptography and secure communications to optimization, sensing and advanced simulation. Yet the report concludes that export restrictions alone will not determine leadership in quantum technologies. Instead, governments increasingly recognize that controlling access to critical technologies must be matched with sustained investment in the companies that produce them.
“The decisive question is no longer which technologies to deny an adversary, but which nodes of one’s own ecosystem to sustain,” the analysts write.
From Reactive Controls to Early Intervention
The report traces the current export-control framework to the collapse of consensus within the Wassenaar Arrangement, the international regime governing exports of conventional arms and dual-use technologies.
Following Russia’s obstruction of updates to the arrangement after 2022, the United States and a growing group of allies shifted toward coordinated national export-control regimes outside the traditional multilateral framework. Since 2024, the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Japan and other partners have developed largely harmonized, but legally separate, systems governing quantum technologies.
According to the analysis, this represents a significant departure from how export controls have historically evolved.
Traditional export controls typically begin with mature products already entering commercial markets before gradually extending upstream into manufacturing equipment and materials. Quantum computing, on the other hand, is being regulated across nearly every layer of its technology stack long before the industry reaches large-scale commercialization.
The controls extend beyond complete quantum computers to include enabling hardware, cryogenic equipment, specialized materials, manufacturing technologies, software and technical know-how.
IISS suggests that governments are attempting to influence the industry’s development rather than merely regulate finished products.
That reflects quantum computing’s unusual position as an emerging technology with potentially significant national-security implications but relatively immature commercial markets.
The challenge is balancing two competing objectives: preventing military exploitation by strategic competitors without unnecessarily slowing research, commercialization and innovation among allies, according to the report.
Supply Chain Choke Points Become Strategic Assets
Central to the report is the concept of “critical nodes” — small numbers of companies or facilities that occupy irreplaceable positions within the quantum supply chain.
Unlike industries dominated by a single country, quantum computing depends on an international network of specialized suppliers spanning materials, manufacturing equipment and components.
No country controls the entire supply chain.
However, the report argues that several indispensable technologies remain concentrated within a handful of firms located primarily in allied nations.
The authors divide the quantum supply chain into three broad layers: materials, equipment and components.
At the materials level, isotopically enriched silicon-28, which is used for high-performance silicon spin qubits, is available in commercially meaningful quantities from only a limited number of facilities worldwide. Helium-3, required for dilution refrigeration systems that cool many quantum computers to temperatures approaching absolute zero, remains scarce because it is produced primarily as a byproduct of tritium decay. Electronic-grade synthetic diamond, important for several quantum sensing and quantum memory applications, is similarly concentrated among relatively few suppliers.
The team writes that equipment presents another significant concentration point.
Superconducting quantum computers — the architecture that’s the focus of many current U.S. export controls — depend on dilution refrigerators capable of reaching temperatures measured in millikelvin. According to the report, only a handful of manufacturers produce these systems at industrial scale, led by Finland’s Bluefors and the United Kingdom’s Oxford Instruments.
Additional concentration exists in control electronics and cryogenic assemblies that connect quantum processors with conventional computing hardware.
The analysts also report that Europe possesses fewer leading quantum-computing companies than the United States but holds disproportionate influence across many of these enabling technologies, giving European suppliers considerable leverage within the broader ecosystem.
Rather than attempting to regulate every element of the supply chain equally, governments are targeting these concentrated nodes where coordinated licensing decisions can have the greatest strategic impact.
Different Countries, Increasingly Similar Policies
The report identifies the United States as having established the most comprehensive quantum export-control regime among Western countries.
In September 2024, the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security introduced controls covering advanced quantum computers exceeding specified technical thresholds, quantum electronic assemblies, cryogenic systems, specialized semiconductor materials, software and related technology.
Rather than prohibiting all quantum technologies, the rules rely on performance thresholds based largely on qubit counts and error rates, effectively targeting systems considered capable enough to create future strategic advantages.
The United States also incorporated measures intended to avoid unnecessarily disrupting international scientific collaboration.
According to the report, Washington created licensing exceptions for countries implementing comparable controls — including Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom — and replaced traditional deemed-export restrictions affecting foreign researchers with record-keeping requirements.
The authors describe this as a notable departure from conventional U.S. export-control policy, reflecting concern that excessive restrictions could ultimately weaken the American research ecosystem.
Under President Donald Trump’s second administration, the report says U.S. policy has increasingly combined export controls with broader supply-chain resilience initiatives.
The administration’s June 2026 Executive Order 14413 calls for preventing adversaries from acquiring quantum-enabling technologies while coordinating export-control policies with allies. Washington has also promoted international coordination through the Quantum Development Group, a coalition of 13 countries focused on supply chains, research collaboration and investment security.
Because European Union export rules historically depended on multilateral agreements, the Wassenaar impasse initially prevented Brussels from implementing union-wide quantum restrictions, making Europe’s path to export controls more complex.
Instead, six member states — including France, Germany and the Netherlands — adopted national controls closely aligned with the United States.
The European Commission later introduced autonomous EU-wide “500-series” controls that took effect in late 2025, replacing many of the earlier national measures and reducing fragmentation within the single market.
The United Kingdom introduced national controls in 2024 before subsequently aligning with the EU’s updated framework. Japan implemented comparable restrictions during the same period, focusing primarily on quantum computers, cryogenic circuits and enabling technologies.
Controls Can Delay Competitors – But Not Stop Them
Although the report concludes that current controls are likely to slow competitors’ access to certain technologies, it suggests they are far from airtight.
The strongest restrictions exist where supply chains remain concentrated.
Cryogenic equipment and quantum electronic assemblies are produced by relatively few companies located within allied jurisdictions, making licensing decisions comparatively effective.
However, the report highlights examples demonstrating how gaps between national regulations can undermine broader policy objectives.
In one case, after the United Kingdom denied an export license for Oxford Instruments equipment, the Beijing Academy of Quantum Information Sciences reportedly obtained dilution refrigerators from Finland’s Bluefors before Finnish controls had been fully implemented.
The authors write that harmonized European regulations now reduce the likelihood of similar inconsistencies.
Materials present a different challenge. While enriched silicon and germanium appear on U.S. control lists, helium-3 and quantum-grade synthetic diamond remain governed primarily through older regulatory frameworks that provide uneven coverage.
Some strategically important materials also remain available from countries outside the Western alliance.
Portions of the world’s silicon-28 production capability exist in Russia and China, limiting the effectiveness of export restrictions, according to the report.
Perhaps more importantly, export controls create incentives for technological self-sufficiency.
According to the analysis, Chinese organizations have already accelerated domestic development of several technologies targeted by Western restrictions.
Within two years of the initial export controls, Chinese organizations including QuantumCTek and the Anhui Quantum Computing Engineering Research Centre had begun factory production of domestically developed dilution refrigerators.
Chinese suppliers have also expanded production of synthetic diamond substrates for quantum applications.
For technologies with broader supplier bases—including many lasers, photonic components and control electronics—the report argues export controls function primarily as friction rather than absolute denial.
They increase costs and slow acquisition but do not permanently prevent competitors from developing alternative supply chains.
The report also notes that technological dependence remains mutual.
China maintains its own restrictions covering sub-6-kelvin cryogenic technology and quantum encryption technologies while simultaneously depending on foreign sources for certain critical materials.
Export Controls Alone Won’t Secure Leadership
Perhaps the report’s most significant conclusion is that export controls represent only one component of a broader industrial strategy.
Quantum leadership ultimately depends not only on restricting competitors but also on sustaining domestic companies capable of manufacturing critical technologies.
Without investment screening, strategically important firms remain vulnerable to foreign acquisitions, the authors argue. Without industrial policy, promising quantum companies may struggle to commercialize technologies or expand manufacturing capacity.
Governments have increasingly responded by pairing export restrictions with public investment.
The report points to the U.S. National Quantum Initiative, along with the administration’s May 2026 letters of intent proposing $2 billion in minority investments across nine quantum companies. Much of that funding is directed toward expanding domestic quantum-chip manufacturing capacity.
Other allied governments have pursued similar approaches.
The United Kingdom has committed £2.5 billion through its National Quantum Strategy. The European Union continues funding research through its €1 billion Quantum Technologies Flagship. Japan has designated 2025 as its “first year of quantum industrialisation.”
Ultimately the team suggests that maintaining leverage requires more than identifying technological choke points.
Companies occupying strategic positions in the supply chain remain valuable only if they continue operating as commercially viable businesses. If export restrictions reduce market opportunities or licensing uncertainty encourages customers to seek alternative suppliers, those strategic advantages could gradually erode.
